Under attack?
Protection for game servers and studios

Protection built for UDP, by people who have filtered game traffic since 2009

Our very first firewall, in 2009, understood exactly one thing: the Counter-Strike query protocol. Seventeen years later the same principle runs the filter - judge traffic by what the packets actually say, never by the port they arrived on. For game hosting that is not a preference, it is the only thing that works.

Why generic filtering fails on game traffic

The attack looks like the game

Both are UDP, both are small packets at high rate to a high-numbered port, and neither completes a handshake a firewall can validate. A rule that stops the flood by pattern will stop the players with it.

Random ports, random payload

We measured a single flood spread over 209 destination ports with the busiest carrying 0.5% of it, and payload bytes with full uniform entropy at every offset. No port rule and no signature can see that - only per-destination volume can.

Latency is the product

Scrubbing that reroutes traffic through a distant centre adds tens of milliseconds. For a shooter that is worse than the attack, and players leave over it.

Protocol-specific abuse

A2S query floods against Source servers, RakNet offline-message floods against Minecraft, FiveM getinfo storms - each has its own shape, and we have the captures for all of them.

What we do differently for game traffic

Always-on, never diverted

Filtering is in the forwarding path at all times, so the route does not change when an attack starts. The latency you measure on a quiet evening is the latency during a flood - there is no diversion event and no BGP convergence to wait out.

Protocol profiles that are measured, not guessed

Source engine, RakNet and FiveM traffic are recognised from their bytes. Our incident captures identify these payloads by signature independently of port, which is how a flood on port 27015 is separated from players on port 27015.

Per-destination budgets that survive a carpet

Attacks against game hosting increasingly spread across an entire allocation. Prefix-level and host-level budgets are evaluated together, so a flood aimed at 256 servers at once is caught by the aggregate.

Optional reverse proxy for the web side

Launcher, store, forum and panel sit behind the Layer 7 service with automatic certificates and challenges only when a session looks wrong, while the game ports stay on pure network filtering where latency matters.

Tier 2 European backbone · European DDoS protected network Built, filtered and operated inside the EU · human NOC 24/7, no AI agents
ISO 9001ISO 27001PCI-DSSGDPRNIS2

For the studio behind the servers

The mitigation is one layer. The same network sells the layers around it - and a stack bought from one operator has nobody in it to blame somebody else.

IP transit

Transit picked for eyeballs, not for price

An IX-heavy blend with direct PNI ports into the access networks players actually sit on, and path selection measured continuously for latency - because a cheap mix is audible in the ping. The transit page →

Transport

Between your game locations

Private Layer 2 between sites for state replication, matchmaking backends and internal tooling - or a wavelength when you want the packet layer entirely yours. Off the public internet either way. EVPN-MPLS transport →

Consulting

Hardware tuned the way we tune ours

NIC selection, queue, RSS and NUMA setup for packet-heavy game workloads - the same work we do on our own filtering fleet - configured, documented and supported after handover. How an engagement runs →

How it is delivered

Protected IPs with direct delivery to your hosts
GRE or tunnelled delivery to servers at another provider
Per-server thresholds set against your measured traffic
Packet captures from every incident, for your own analysis

Protection for other sectors